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ABSTRACT
‘Fly Your Satellite!’ (FYS) is a recurring hands-on programme conducted by the ESA (European Space Agency)
Academy Unit of ESA’s Education Office. Fly Your Satellite! was established to support university student teams in
the development of their own CubeSats by enabling a transfer of knowledge and experience from ESA specialists to
students. Selected teams are guided through project reviews and supervised through design consolidation and
verification activities, conducted according to ESA professional practice and to standards tailored to fit the scope of
university CubeSat projects.
This paper focuses on key lessons learned and issues identified during the ongoing verification activities of the
CubeSats in the second cycle of FYS (FYS2), and on how that experience is used to the benefit of participants of
future cycles, including the teams in the third cycle (FYS3), who are now in the late stages of their Critical Design
Review. Special attention is given to the lessons learned during the manufacturing, assembly, integration and testing
phases as experience shows that first-time developers tend to underestimate the number of issues which arise when
the design is translated from documentation and models into physical hardware. The lessons learned are categorised
into the topics of Development, AIV, Project Management, and Product Assurance.
In the Development category, the lessons learns suggest attention should be focused on emphasizing the importance
of development models and FlatSats for early testing, proactive development of aspects which don’t appear to be
immediately critical or appear to be on the project’s critical path (such as software and test GSE), and anticipating the
need for compatibility with a range of possible orbit scenarios.
The Assembly, Integration, and Verification category contains a large variety of lessons learned from the preparation
for AIV activities, anomalies encountered, and reflection on what was done well in the programme. These lessons
cover topics such as dimensional requirement non-conformances, electromagnetic interferences, and
recommendations for system level testing preparation.
Lessons learned for the Project Management category mostly arise from the understandable lack of (space) project
management experience of the student teams, and the discussion focuses on possible mitigation approaches that can
be implemented. Specific topics covered include delayed project schedules, management of student resources, risk
management, and experiences with legal and regulatory requirements.
The lessons learned on Product Assurance stem primarily from the difficulties in applying standard methodologies to
educational small spacecraft projects. Problems with configuration control, clean room practices, and anomaly
investigation methods are discussed, with recommendations for how student teams could solve such issues, primarily
through the creation of additional documentation to track modifications and processes implemented
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INTRODUCTION TO FLY YOUR SATELLITE!

University teams that are successful in their application
start the programme in the ‘Design Your Satellite!’
phase, already with a detailed design proposal that is then
reviewed by ESA specialists, who identify key issues
and assist in solving them in preparation for the Critical
Design Review (CDR). During the CDR, the formal
review panel and review board study every aspect of the
project, including technical design, management (e.g.,
funding, schedule, project team, facilities), educational
return, and legal & regulatory aspects, e.g., frequency
notification to ITU (International Telecommunication
Union), space debris mitigation. Those teams that are
considered to have the detailed design at a mature level,
and that have adequately dealt with the actions assigned
are then accepted to enter the next phase.

‘Fly Your Satellite!’ (FYS) is a programme in the ESA
Education Office dedicated to one, two, and three-unit
CubeSats developed with educational scopes. The
programme is open to university teams from ESA
Member and Associate Member States1.
Within FYS, university students are supported and
mentored by ESA specialists with the purpose of
ensuring that the satellites undergo thorough
verification, increasing the chances for a successful
mission. Students become acquainted with standard
practices of the professional space sector by applying
methodologies to their CubeSat project similar to those
applied in larger ESA missions. FYS also offers access
to state-of-art ESA test facilities, aiming at reducing the
entry barrier for teams with less resources, as well as a
launch opportunity for those achieving flight readiness.

In the ‘Build Your Satellite!’ phase, the teams engage in
procurement and manufacturing activities, followed by
the assembly, integration and functional testing of their
spacecraft. All the activities are performed following
procedures carefully reviewed by ESA specialists.

The missions undertaken by the university CubeSats are
conceived by the students’ teams, and the development
is funded by the universities and/or by their public or
private sponsors. By participating in their CubeSat
project, the students gain significant practical experience
in the lifecycle of a real satellite project.

Following a Functional Test Review to establish that the
team has developed a fully functional spacecraft and
ground segment, successful teams are allowed to begin
the ‘Test Your Satellite!’ phase, where the satellites are
submitted to an environmental test campaign, using
facilities and operator support that are provided by ESA.
Many tests are conducted at ESA Education’s own
CubeSat Support Facility (CSF) located at the ESEC,
Galaxia site in Belgium. The campaign includes, at least,
vibration testing and thermal vacuum/thermal cycling
tests, with additional testing being performed where
required. If the CubeSats have meet the success criteria
in the environmental and functional tests, and the teams
demonstrate that their ground and space segment meet
all applicable requirements, they are awarded the access
to the ‘Launch Your Satellite!’ phase following a Flight
Acceptance Review (FAR).

As such, while largely addressing the engineering
aspects, the programme also focuses on non-engineering
topics that are to be covered in the undertaking of an
actual space mission, such as frequency registration,
space debris mitigation, and third party liability.
FYS Programme Phases
The ongoing second2 and third3 editions of ‘Fly Your
Satellite!’ consist of five phases (Error! Reference
source not found.) that closely resemble the
development stages of a professional satellite project. At
the end of each phase, the CubeSats are submitted to
formal review processes, tailored from ECSS (European
Cooperation in Space Standardization) standards. This
provides the students with the experience of ESA
reviews, thus providing them with valuable knowledge
for a future career in the space industry.

In preparation for the launch, the students actively
support the safety approval process, assist in the
installation of the spacecraft in the deployer and perform
the necessary tests to ensure their system is ready to start

Figure 1: Fly Your Satellite! Programme Phases
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the operational mission. Before the launch, the students
have the opportunity to participate in the launch
readiness review, interfacing with the launch authorities
where possible.
The CubeSats are either launched and deployed to orbit
directly from the launch vehicle upper stage, or launched
as cargo to the International Space Station and deployed
from there. The deployment to orbit initiates the last
phase of FYS, called ‘Operate Your Satellite!’. In this
phase, the teams utilise their own ground stations to
receive telemetry and to control the spacecraft during the
early operations as well as the operational part of the
mission, which may last from 3 months up to multiple
years. The orbit in which the satellites are deployed is
selected to offer a suitable lifetime in compliance to the
ESA space debris mitigation requirements.

3.

System environmental test campaign: vibration,
thermal vacuum/ thermal cycling / thermal
balance tests, and other environmental tests as
needed.

DEVELOPMENT
The Need for Development Models and Prototypes
From experience it has been seen that some teams
underestimated the need to build and test a prototype or
engineering model of their in-house developed units.
Inexperience has led to considering that the definition of
the design in a document, coupled with the result of
extensive analysis was sufficient to close the design and
directly manufacture the unit Flight Model (FM).
The result of this approach was that often subsystem
flight models were demoted to Development Models
(DM) or Engineering Models (EM) following failure of

CubeSat final assembly & integration
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6.

Lessons learned are presented below, categorised into
the topics of Development, AIV, Project Management,
and Product Assurance.

Phase D encompasses all the manufacturing, assembly,
integration, and verification activities needed to build
and verify the CubeSat flight model, and concludes with
the FAR, where teams are granted a launch opportunity
if successful. The following major milestones are in the
programme planning for phase D:

Subsystems qualification and verification:
functional
and
performance
testing,
environmental tests

System functional test campaign: Full
Functional, Mission (day-in-the-life) and Endto-end tests in laboratory conditions

It should be noted that while some lessons learned and
experiences may unique to student CubeSat or small
satellite projects, it may be that many aspects can be seen
in other projects with similar attributes e.g. limited
budgets, small dynamic / changing teams, limited
experience and many lessons learned are not unique to
student teams. Furthermore the primary purpose of the
FYS programme is the education of the students
participating, and therefore it is expected that lessons
learned and potential improvements are proactively
investigated and discussed.

In Fly Your Satellite!, almost all of the AIV activities are
conducted in Phase D, during the Build and Test Your
Satellite! programme phases. This differs from standard
practice, where it is expected that AIV, and particularly
qualification or TRL (Technology Readiness level)
raising activities begin during Phase C or sooner. This
difference stems from the need to ensure students’ teams
get sufficient expert review of their baseline design in
Phase C, before they spend their (often limited) budget
on procurement of hardware to begin testing. While this
approach is successful, there is also a large benefit to
performing development tests early in the project, a topic
discussed at length in this paper, and this approach may
change during the preparation for future FYS
programme cycles.

2.

5.

The concurrent nature of the FYS programme, with
teams in different cycles at different stages of their
projects, fosters a unique context where lessons learned
from one programme cycle can be applied to the others.
This results in an overall enhancement of the educational
value for the students, and of the quality of the different
projects, as common issues are identified and addressed
for all teams. Tapping into this experience, the FYS
programme phases, milestones and educational
opportunities have been reshaped accordingly
throughout the various cycles.

Phase D and AIV in Fly Your Satellite!

Subsystem manufacturing and/or procurement
from suppliers

Dimensional, physical, and external interfaces
verification

INTRODUCTION TO THE LESSONS LEARNED

The participation in ‘Fly Your Satellite!’ concludes with
an evaluation of the operational phase and a Lessons
Learned workshop, where the path of the teams through
the programme is put into perspective and improvements
for both CubeSat projects and ESA are drawn.

1.

4.
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the subsystem verification campaign, for example when
detecting out-of-spec performance.

created with the idea in mind that they will be changed,
fixed, or expanded on when the time is available to do
so. This means changes in the software configuration,
which puts the validity of the tests performed using this
software in question.

While not manufacturing DM/EM seems to fit well the
low-cost profile of student projects, this can result in
longer schedules and unforeseen costs:
•

•

FlatSats for Compatibility Checks and Software
Development

The time to conduct complex analysis shall not
be underestimated. For the development of
certain subsystems it may be simpler to define
or verify performances with a test, than to run
and validate the analysis. This approach may be
applied, for example, in the development of
TT&C equipment or deployable mechanisms.

While AIV plans issued in Phase C allocate a short
period in Phase D for verification using FlatSat models,
it has been seen that teams often end-up relying heavily
on this configuration for design and verification
activities. A FlatSat serves the threefold purpose of
confirming compatibility of interfaces, accelerating
software development, and facilitating the definition of
operational procedures.

Not having sufficient budget to manufacture
additional models can put the project in a
difficult situation as human errors should be
expected. This is especially common in an
education environment, where the lack of
experience of students in working with
hardware results in unintentional damages to
the units. The same philosophy on extra budget
applies in cases of COTS (Commercial Off The
Shelf) units’ damage or degradation.

In particular, the FlatSat model turned out to be of
special value for systems with a mix of in-house and
COTS units to verify the data and power buses, and the
software/firmware compatibility. This configuration also
facilitates access to debug and programming connectors
and the resolution of hardware issues on specific PCBs,
before the CubeSat internal stack is integrated.
Based on this experience, the programme
recommendation to future participants will be to start
FlatSat activities in earlier design phases and to plan
them for longer durations. It should be noted that in this
configuration, special protections shall be implemented
to avoid the damage of expensive or difficult to replace
flight/qualification models and sometimes the risk of
damaging the unit outweighs the benefits of its
integration in the FlatSat.

Software / Firmware Development Oversights
A common theme seen in the FYS CubeSat projects is
the issue of delayed software / firmware development for
in-house subsystems and the main on-board software.
This generally occurs because in early phases the student
teams will have a heavy focus on the physical
architecture of the system and the supporting analysis. It
is often the case that the software development stays in a
theoretical state until well into Phase D, and is even
delayed to the last possible moment before it is required.
The software development time is often underestimated
and finds itself on the critical path of the project
schedule.

Missing Analysis of Acceptable Orbit Ranges for
CubeSat Missions
Many student CubeSat projects do not have a
consolidated mission analysis or understanding of which
orbit ranges their mission can be compatible with. The
approach of most teams is to assume a “baseline orbit”
during the design stage. This often causes a problem as
CubeSat missions often rely on rideshare or piggyback
opportunities for launch. The possible orbit scenarios
within the typical Sun Synchronous Orbits (SSO) or ISSrelated orbits still have enough variance that considering
one “baseline orbit” is not enough to ensure
compatibility with all scenarios. Factors such as altitude,
eclipse fraction, and radiation doses can be significantly
different between the ISS and SSO orbit options
available.

Beyond the issue of schedule revisions, if software
becomes the limiting factor before the team can move to
the testing that they would like to perform in Phase D,
shortcuts in the development become a temptation.
Initial software builds are rushed to completion and are
unfinished, only providing the most basic functionality
which allows the test results to be obtained, but only be
conclusive at a hardware level.
This approach can lead to more issues down the line.
First, the rushed development process presents an
increased risk of software bugs, some of which put test
campaign results into question or delay the project
further during the troubleshooting. Beyond this,
however, is the fact that these initial software builds are
Castillo-Sancho
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understanding of compatibility with orbits is not
prepared for the project, the team will need to repeat their
analysis during Phase D to understand if they are
compatible with new orbit options. There are two major
risks here. The first risk is that students who performed
previous analyses may have left the team, so there may
be delays in repeating this analysis. The second risk is
that due to lack of orbit compatibility assessment in the
early stages, it may be that the baseline design is only
viable for an unrealistically narrow range of orbits. This
inevitably leads to design changes during Phase D,
which can impact the schedule or cost budget, and can
invalidate previous test results.

The solution to these issues is to move the development
of these deployment mechanisms to early stages of the
project, allowing time for extensive testing and design
iterations. Careful attention should be paid to having low
variance in the burn times, as any variance will be
amplified during TVAC testing. Characterisation of the
heating element performance is crucial during anomaly
investigations related to the deployment.
Design for Testing
In a perfect world, the entire development cycle of a
project should be considered at the design stage, where
performing modifications is still relatively easy and
cheap, when compared to later stages of the project.

Development of Melt Line retained Deployable
Mechanisms

Figure 2 reflects how in space projects, due to the
uniqueness and elevated cost of the hardware, any late
design change in the project can have a dramatic effect
in terms of cost and schedule impact (e.g. missing the
launch!).

Many student CubeSat teams elect to develop their own
deployable antenna mechanisms, as it is a valuable
educational experience to develop an in-house
subsystem and it can reduce costs. A recurring lesson
learned in the FYS programme is that the effort to move
from a design concept to a prototype and then to a flight
model is much larger than most student teams expect.
The deployable mechanisms are typically spring loaded
and retained using a tensioned melt line and deployed by
means of a heating element to burn the line. This
approach is used because of its heritage on past CubeSat
missions, the fact that it uses cheap and easy to procure
components, and that it is a simple mechanism, implying
reliability. Because the deployment of the antennas is a
mission critical functionality, the mechanism must be
proven to be reliable through intensive testing. This is
where teams in the FYS programme have encountered
issues, but also where the experience and expertise of the
FYS programme can add significant value to the
projects.

In the case of CubeSats, where resources are more
limited than in larger projects, the accumulation of
changes can quickly grow to become a showstopper.

The setup of the melt line and heating element must be
carefully implemented to ensure reliability. The
tensioning of the melt line and the dissipation of heat
from the heating elements are factors which must be well
defined in the prototype stage. If the prototype does not
implement these factors exactly as they will be
implemented on the flight model, there can be
significantly different performance of the mechanism. At
high levels of tension in the melt lines, there can be some
slip of the knots / crimps or stretch of the lines over time
which reduces the tension, so some teams choose to
pretension the lines to reduce this effect and increase
reliability. The use of a melt line and heating element
also proves to be sensitive to the environment it is placed
in. During thermal vacuum testing, many teams discover
that at cold temperatures they are unable to burn their
melt lines and perform a successful deployment.
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Figure 2 Impact of Late Changes in Space Projects
The inflection point in the curve is the Assembly and
Integration (AI) of the spacecraft, after which the
spacecraft is placed under tight configuration control and
any modification has to be carefully assessed in order to
prevent invalidation of previous verification activities.
From then on, it is natural that the more verification
activities are performed, the lower the ease of change and
the higher the cost of performing that change.
The system-level environmental tests take place after
Assembly and Integration, but also require a lot of
previous preparation to be performed successfully. For
instance, the TVAC test is an excellent example for this
lesson learned. Test temperature sensors internal to the
spacecraft which are essential to the TVAC test must be
5
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attached during assembly and integration, and clearances
for the cables to exit the spacecraft must be foreseen
already at the design stage. The same goes for interfaces
with the TVAC chamber or ground support equipment,
umbilical connectors, and other capabilities required
during thermal vacuum testing.

Another reason for this issue, however, comes from the
assumptions made on the dimensions of components.
Student teams often lack expertise in the design of
systems with strict dimensional requirements. They
overlook the fact that even if they design their system to
exactly
to
meet
dimensional
requirements,
manufacturing tolerances can stop them from doing so in
reality. Additionally, it has been observed that product
assurance issues on the side of COTS suppliers results in
equipment violating the dimensions shown on
datasheets, even beyond the tolerances.

If the test interfaces are not adequately considered from
an early point, by the time of the environmental testing
teams will find themselves having to perform last minute
modifications to the design, and often partial reassembly
of the system. This will be costly in terms of schedule, at
a time when the launch opportunity is probably already
on the horizon.

The impact of this problem is generally that the student
teams need to remanufacture their side panels, internal
PCBs, or stack spacers, either to reduce the panel
thickness or to change parts and components. In case
remanufacturing is not possible, there is a risk that the
Request for Waiver for the dimensional requirements is
not accepted by the deployer responsible authority. If the
teams can select the orbital deployer, this will also limit
the choice to only those deployers allowing extra
volume.

ASSEMBLY, INTEGRATION & VERIFICATION
CubeSat Dimensional Non-Compliances
Spacecraft dimensional requirement violations, due to
protruding components on the side faces or out-of-spec
structures, are often uncovered during verification at the
assembly and integration stage. By violating
dimensional requirements put into place by standards4,5,
CubeSat teams are reducing compatibility with the
CubeSat deployers available on the market and thus
limiting potential launch opportunities.

Student teams are encouraged to monitor their CAD
models closely, design with geometrical tolerances in
mind, and to perform measurements and inspections on
procured parts which could contribute to these violations
and interferences.
It is also considered beneficial to include margins in the
design, in terms of the dimensional envelope, in a way
that in case unforeseen changes are required, the
boundaries of the design can be pushed without
necessarily resulting in non-compliances.

It has been seen in the FYS programme that these noncompliances are not noticed until the procurement of
satellite hardware is well underway, and often not until
the system stack is assembled and measured. Many
violations found were due to parts mounted on the
surface of the side panels protruding past the allowable
limits. CubeSat width and height variations were also
observed depending on the assembly and fastener
tightening procedure.

Uneventful Final Assembly & Integration
The FYS programme has identified some critical steps
which can be taken to allow for a successful A&I
activity. Following these steps resulted in the FYS
CubeSats running into no major anomalies during the
A&I activities. In addition, almost no deviations in the
CubeSat dimensional and physical requirements were
uncovered upon completion of the assembly. Some of
the actions taken for this seemingly smooth result are:

Additionally, interferences between components of the
internal PCB stack were common. They do not formally
impact acceptance of the CubeSat for integration of the
deployer, but they certainly prevent the correct mating of
equipment.
There is not just one reason why this problem recurs, in
fact there are several potential sources to this problem.
The first reason for this is a lack of detail in CAD models
of the system, which do not accurately represent the
components later found to cause this issue. In some
cases, however, it is clear that even when the CAD model
included the components, the CAD model was not
actually checked against the requirements at all. This is
because the teams assumed that their COTS structure
would be designed such that there would be space for
such components on the surface.
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•

Early inspections and dimensions verification
with E(Q)M or (P)FM structures and side
panels attached in flight-like configuration,
including stowed deployables. This activity
uncovered deviations to CubeSat standard
requirements: protruding components, out-ofspec structures, problems in rail anodization,
etc.

•

Early checks of the volume available for
harnessing.
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•

Dimensional verification of each item upon
arrival from the manufacturer or supplier.

•

Preparation and, most importantly, validation
of the procedure for CubeSat Assembly &
Integration. Details of the procedure include the
order of integration of all components and the
application of specific processes (thermocouple
installation, torque application to screws,
harness routing and fixation, etc.).

captured in the test specifications were going beyond the
verification of their (sub-)system requirements, like the
verification of safety functions, event triggers, etc. This
was aggravated by the fact that the test pass/fail criteria
did not always cover the additional verifications outside
requirements.
The impact of a poor flow of requirements is exacerbated
if the group of students participating in the design phase
is different from those working on AIV activities. The
need for a proper definition and documentation of
requirements is key to avoid the loss of knowledge, and
to ensure a systematic verification of the functional and
operational design.

Unclear Distinction between Mission and FullFunctional Test
When preparing the test specification for full-functional
and mission tests6, the distinction between the two was
not always clear for the teams. In short:
•

Full-Functional test is requirements oriented. It
is a comprehensive test to demonstrate the
integrity of all functions of the item under test,
in all operational modes, redundancy paths,
including back‐up modes and all foreseen
transitions. The main objective of this tests is to
demonstrate the absence of design,
manufacturing, and integration error.

•

Mission test is mission and operations oriented.
Its definition is driven by the Concept of
Operations and the expected mission timeline.
It serves to validate the operational procedures
for nominal and contingency modes or
scenarios.

Electromagnetic Interferences Encountered During
System Stack Testing
Electromagnetic interference (EMI), which can cause
serious problems in the function of CubeSat projects, is
often only encountered when the system is first
assembled into a full stack and tested. Many student
teams go through extensive FlatSat testing campaigns,
only to find that when they assemble their CubeSat they
have EMI issues.
These problems arise from the close proximity of EMI
sources (e.g. RF transmission) with EMI victims (e.g.
microcontroller peripherals), and the effects can be hard
to predict. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely solvable
with software patches, and usually require a change in
the design (e.g. the addition of an RF filter, a change in
wire routing, change of PCB grounding plane). This
means that the schedule impact of such issues can be
severe (in the range of 3 - 5 months); especially
considering that this occurs after completing the
assembly of the system stack and at least a partial
disassembly is required.

Ground Segment permitting, during Mission Test it is
recommended to operate the satellite from its Mission
Control Centre in order to validate the full command and
telemetry encoding/decoding chain.
Definition of Verification Testing Goes Beyond
Requirements

The lesson learned in the FYS programme is that it is
valuable to assess the electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) of the system from an early stage. By
characterising the expected EMI sources and victims at
an early stage, the design team can be aware of the
possible risks they may face during AIV. EMI
mitigations can be implemented, such as shielding or
partitioning of high risk components.

Upon selection to participate in FYS, CubeSat teams
were instructed to apply a requirements engineering
methodology to their project lifecycle. In general, the
flow-down of requirements from mission, to system, and
to the component level was not always well established.
Multiple teams had defined only a reduced set of mission
and system level requirements, while the design had
matured without performing a flow-down to subsystem
or lower level requirements. The importance of the
requirements to later serve as the baseline of the
verification activities was furthermore underestimated.

The reality of educational CubeSat projects shows that it
is often beyond the scope of student teams to fully
characterise and mitigate EMI issues on their system,
and they must rely on functional tests at system level as
a form of EMC testing. Ideally this functional testing
would be done as soon as possible, such as on an
engineering qualification model. Merely by being aware
of the issue and making an attempt to characterise and
mitigate EMI effects, the student teams will be in a better

The lack of a comprehensive set of technical
requirements was recognised by teams when defining the
testing activities for subsystem and system functional
verifications. It was often the case that the activities
Castillo-Sancho
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position in the event that such an issue does occur. Major
milestones (e.g. Full Functional Test at system level)
should be accompanied by significant margin in the
schedule, to account for issues such as this.

for each team were learned from and never repeated in
future tests.
Mechanical Qualification Levels: Flexibility is Key
It is a reality that student CubeSat teams often have to
adapt to changes in the launch opportunity as they are
never the main customers for the launch. Unexpected
changes in the launch vehicle or launch configuration
may result in an under-qualification to the new flight
levels, as the levels selected in the original AIV approach
can be lower than the those finally required by the launch
authorities.

Neglect in GSE Development Leads to Stress During
AIV Milestones
Ground support equipment (GSE) required for assembly,
integration and testing activities is never the star of the
show, taking background priority over the development
of the space or ground segments.
It has been observed at test campaigns taking place at the
CSF that GSE is often the weak link in many of the test
setups put together by the teams, resulting in delays to
test activities and, in extreme cases, making it impossible
to draw any valuable conclusion from tests due to doubt
on whether the setup was adequate or not.

To mitigate this risk, teams are advised to not try to
optimise levels early on and instead opt for designing
their systems towards the strictest possible
environmental requirements. A good starting point is the
NASA General Environmental Verification Standard,
widely acknowledged as a suitable envelope of
environmental requirements.

Examples of poor GSE practices and their consequences
are included below.
•

Using jumper cables and breadboard style
connections instead of proper connectors and
harnessing, causing setup unreliability, prone to
short circuits or open circuits.

•

Not testing the GSE prior to the test activity,
leading to the need for modifications on the spot
or parts of the setup not working as intended. A
dry run is always recommended before any test!

•

Damage to spacecraft subsystems due to
improper grounding practices.

•

Keeping data stored in memory without
dumping it to a log file before the test is over
can cause the loss of test data due to memory
overflow or computer crash. Always ensure that
data is recorded in a reliable place.

•

GSE software not tested beforehand can create
lots of bugs during the test activity and a loss of
confidence in the test setup.

•

Overreliance on (Kapton) tape, which is prone
to losing adhesion during thermal vacuum tests,
can result in damage to the item under test or
the setup.

This approach can be challenging to begin with, and may
be considered by some as over-testing or overengineering, but will very likely reduce the need for
future delta-testing and will lead to a smoother, and
cheaper, execution of the project’s AIV plan.
COTS and Subsystem Qualification Status
One of the benefits of procuring a COTS subsystem or
unit is that often the environmental qualification of the
item in question has already been conducted. Teams are
recommended to request reports of the qualification
status in which the test specification and the test results
are captured. While this may seem trivial at the time of
procurement, this information is key when assessing the
qualification against the launch environment levels.
Application of Proper Torque to Fasteners
The number one cause of vibration test anomalies is the
lack of properly specified torque values for the fasteners.
Higher than adequate torque leads to screw heads
stripping or damage to the item under test, while lower
than adequate torque leads to screws loosening during
the test, potentially causing serious damage to the item
under test.
“Hand tight” is not a scientific way to measure torque.
Safety and Reliability Requirements Impact on AIV
Plan

It should be noted that such problems are not due to poor
design intent on the part of the student teams, but often
are the result of short preparation timelines and
inexperience with the specific test setups. In almost all
cases, the issues that were seen in the first test campaigns
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Safety requirements can add a considerable overhead to
the design and, especially, to the verification plan of a
project. This happens not only in terms of the required
number of tests to be performed, but also the level of
detail required to demonstrate compliance to those
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requirements. This can be translated either in additional
project time (in-house) and/or in additional cost (both inhouse and COTS). Two examples of this are ISS safety
certifications, and in-house development of an EPS
(Electrical Power Subsystem).

development, FlatSat testing, and system level testing,
the ability to interact with the hardware through the
EGSE and a remote access connection allows student
CubeSat teams many advantages. In the best case, this
involves being able to fully operate the satellite while it
is in the clean room and the students are at home.

Furthermore, reliability requirements imposed by
manufacturers can also add constraints to the verification
plan, so teams are advised to carefully discuss the
implication of the manufacturer’s reliability
requirements before purchasing a COTS part or
subsystem. A clear example of this is with the operation
of antenna deployment. These mechanisms are
sometimes sold with only a limited number of
guaranteed deployments or, in extreme cases, the
manufacturer requires the antenna to be shipped back to
their facilities for refurbishment, which causes
disruption at system level, when the spacecraft should
remain under configuration control.

This capability allowed team members to participate in
hardware testing and development in a spontaneous and
convenient way. Team members could begin or join
ongoing work on the hardware without the need for a
physical presence in the facility. The advantage of this
was even more apparent during the COVID-19
pandemic, when access to many university facilities was
limited. Student teams which were able to set up such a
remote connection were able to continue making
progress throughout the many months of restricted
access to facilities. When only one team member could
access the facility due to COVID restrictions, they could
have another team member join remotely to serve in the
produce assurance role during testing.

Lack of Access to Test Facilities
Student CubeSat teams are generally reliant on their
university facilities and facilities provided by their
sponsoring partners to perform tests for their project. In
the FYS programme, the student teams are also given
limited access to a range of test facilities operated by or
associated with ESA.

Remote access to the hardware setups also benefits long
duration tests, such as mission testing, where operations
on the hardware are occurring outside of normal working
hours. Student teams were able to easily monitor their
test results at any hour, without a requirement for
physical presence in the clean room.

A challenge that is faced by many CubeSat teams is the
ability to identify and book test facilities which meet the
requirements of their mission. A clear example of this is
in the performance testing of VHF antennas, which are
commonly used in CubeSat TT&C subsystems. A test
facility with the capabilities to properly measure the
performance of a VHF antenna is hard to find, as the
frequency is relatively low (compared to UHF or S-band,
the other common CubeSat communication frequencies)
which means that a large anechoic chamber is required
to provide acceptable results. A facility with the
capability to test VHF antennas is unlikely to be
available on university premises, and the student teams
need to look elsewhere for this option, often joining long
waiting lists for a test slot.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Rolling Schedules
Many student teams struggle to predict the duration of
development and AIV activities. This is not an
uncommon situation in long-term projects with many
new developments, but in the case of student projects it
is compounded by their lack of previous experience. This
schedule slip is even more exaggerated in cases where
there is not a fixed launch opportunity (in particular a
launch date) defined for the project.
Throughout the programme, it was noticed that teams
were frequently struggling to predict their schedules
beyond a 2-4 month window into the future, often
iterating over designs and tests multiple times,
sometimes with the hope of improving results i.e. not
accepting ‘good enough’. In addition, major anomalies
occurring during tests of flight or qualification models
resulted in delays between one and five months in the
schedule.

The lesson learned here is that planning for testing in
Phase D should include a thorough review of test
facilities available, making sure that their capabilities are
adequate. Alternative test approaches, like performance
testing of antennas outdoors using a development model,
can also be considered.
Remote Access to Test Setups in the Clean Room
The ability to operate satellite hardware through a remote
access connection from outside of the university
premises was seen as a very valuable capability for teams
in the FYS programme. During subsystem software
Castillo-Sancho
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maintain granular schedules in the short-term and highlevel work-packages with generous margins in the longterm. It is also recommended to keep open
communications with regards to launch opportunities,
test facility availability etc.

during testing once the hardware is eventually procured,
which results in changes to the designs presented at the
CDR. The changes to baselined designs result in delays
to the project, and the lesson learned is to not push for an
early CDR until prototypes of critical in-house
developments have been demonstrated.

Activities Not Predicted Well in Schedules

In future editions of the programme, an informal review
will be organised upon acceptance to the programme to
review the AIV plans for phase C and D. Teams will be
encouraged to allocate funding to the development of
prototypes for testing before the formal CDR starts, with
the goal of significantly reducing the need for design
changes after CDR.

While most of the teams prepared a reasonable AIV
sequence for their system, the following activities turned
out to be drivers of the schedule in the short term,
causing overall delays in the schedule:
•

Procurement activities and lead times

•

Software and Firmware development, both in
the flight and ground segment.

•

FlatSat configuration was extensively used for
software debugging and validation, beyond
what was predicted.

•

The development and validation of AIT tools
and facilities, such as
o

•

When planning procurement activities, there are four
aspects that should be paid special attention to:

Preparation of subsystem environmental testing
(additional analysis, manufacturing of GSE)
and subsequent redesigns triggered by
anomalies.

•

•

Procurement Considerations

Test benches: FlatSat motherboards,
Helmholtz coils, sun simulators,
optical test benches, etc.

o

Ground Support Equipment (GSE):
jigs, stands, power supplies, harness,
hand tools, etc.

o

Cleanroom preparation to host the
flight hardware

Ground Station installation and setup for
operation. Development of Mission Control
software.

1.

Third-party developments: At earlier stages of
the project, teams may have decided to procure
a product “in development”. This puts the team
at the mercy of someone else’s delays, and this
can result in schedule problems which teams
have no control over. Developers should
consider looking for qualified components, and
flight heritage if possible; there should be a very
good rationale to rely on third party
developments.

2.

Good communication with suppliers: Detailed
information like lead time (from purchase order
to delivery), option sheets, product
qualification status / test reports, availability of
datasheets and extensive user manuals,
engineering support hours, etc. should be clear
to the party procuring the product. It should be
also understood if the documentation can be
available before receiving the actual item so
that the customer may familiarise themselves
with all manuals and datasheets.

3.

Funding administration rules: Universities and
other public entities follow their own rules and
approval loops before a purchase order can be
sent to a supplier. Enrolling the support of
experienced staff can help developers
understand the administration cycles and avoid
foreseeable issues.

4.

Always when receiving an item, teams should
carry out incoming inspections. As a minimum,
visual inspection (for soldering quality,
contamination)
and
verification
of
conformance to datasheet or purchase order
(component placement, pinout connectors,

Newcomers’ on-boarding period, exams, and
holiday slowdown.

Scheduling of CDR
The Critical Design Review (CDR) is the first formal
review within the programme for which the teams
document in detail the allocation of AIV activities for the
system, subsystems, and units. The student projects are
typically constrained by their own funding schemes,
such that they choose to wait for the CDR to be passed
before they begin the procurement of hardware. It is
extremely common for anomalies to be discovered
Castillo-Sancho
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dimensions, mass, serial numbers, etc.) should
be conducted. For more complex systems,
additional acceptance tests shall be planned to
verify the functions, electrical configuration,
interfaces, etc.

The important lesson learned here is that the project
manager must make an active effort to manage the
student resources and transfer of knowledge. There are
many ways to approach this task.
An effort must be made to compare the project schedules
with the academic plans of the students. It is valuable to
anticipate the departure of students and be ready to
recruit more students when needed. It is also common for
teams to hire/provide a research grant for graduating
students on a temporary basis so that they can complete
a critical task.

The importance of the incoming inspection procedures
was confirmed as teams uncovered quality issues in the
COTS products received, e.g. poor-quality crimps,
conformal coating application issues, damaged screws,
incorrect connector size, incorrect machining of thread
holes, etc..
Furthermore, teams also make mistakes in their purchase
orders (incorrect components selected, specific
instructions missing) and review of the design files/
option sheets are needed before the updated part is
ordered. Conducting incoming inspection procedures
enables the systematic checking of all arrived products
and avoids delays. Having a second person review the
order in the first place could help prevent the issues in
advance.

One simple way to promote transfer of knowledge is to
ensure that students are working in groups and
communicating with each other. Ideally this involves
overlapping the tasks of incoming students with
experienced/departing students to allow for direct
knowledge transfer. If students are working in isolation,
it is inevitable that when they depart the team there will
be a loss of expertise.
In parallel to the management of student resources, the
CubeSat team should encourage the creation of
documentation which can be used to trace what was done
by past team members. This involves documenting more
than just results from tests/analysis, but also established
procedures, thought processes, research references, and
meeting minutes.

One common practice is to procure three copies of
inexpensive items: one to release for flight, one for
testing/qualification and one spare. Once items are
accepted, the cleaning and storage recommendations
from the manufacturer shall be followed.
Loss of Expertise and Continuity due to Graduating
Students

Mission Authorisation Challenges

The reality of long-term projects run by student teams is
that students will come and go from the project. This
happens when students graduate, get internships, or other
commitments interfere with their ability to contribute.
The loss of student resources can create immediate and
long-term problems for the project. In the short-term, it
can mean that the project has lost expertise on a
particular subject matter, or that ongoing developments
are delayed while another student takes over the tasks of
the departing team member. In the long-term, it might
mean that there are difficulties re-running analyses
which were done by departed team members, for
example if there is a design update which changes the
assumptions made in the initial analysis.

CubeSats, like all spacecraft, must obtain mission
authorisation from their national government before they
can be approved for a launch. The challenges associated
with this process vary significantly depending on the
national legislation.

One of the leading causes of this issue is that optimistic
project schedules may imply that the student will have
enough time to complete and document their work before
their planned departure from the team. If this schedule
eventually is not met, a proper handover of
responsibilities and expertise may not be completed to
the standard that the team would hope for.

Upon acceptance to the programme, teams are reminded
of the importance of starting the international and
national frequency allocation and coordination. Because
of the risk of conflicts or coordination problems, and the
risk that the relevant authorities may ask operators to
apply changes to the radio system which may also result
in additional costs, teams are encouraged to fulfil these
obligations as early as possible.

Project managers for CubeSat teams should get as much
information as possible on the applicable space laws for
their mission to obtain the required mission authorisation
within a reasonable time frame. Contact should be
established with the relevant authorities as early as
possible and maintained throughout the project lifetime.
Frequency Allocation and Coordination

This problem is nearly unavoidable in educational
CubeSat projects, but the impact of it can be mitigated.
Castillo-Sancho
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PRODUCT ASSURANCE

Good practice for configuration control is that all updates
to a deliverable item (hardware, software, but also a
report, a technical document, a plan, a technical
requirement, etc.) are tracked and each updated version
is assigned a configuration identifier. It is instead often
the case that university students need to be reminded of
the need to account for any change occurred in a baseline
configuration since a previous issue of a certain
deliverable. “Change to a baseline configuration” does
not necessarily refer only to hardware changes, but also
to variation from a previously defined operational
concept, update of numerical models based on test result,
a software function being updated, or change of plan
(e.g., a test activity initially foreseen is not carried out
anymore, or vice-versa).

Importance of Root Cause Analysis and Data
Gathering During Development Model Testing
Anomalies that appear during development testing are
prone to being discarded as part of the normal trial and
error process that occurs during development, without
any further investigation into the root cause of the issue.
This effect is to be (partially) expected in student teams,
due to the lack of resources that prevent following up on
every single issue. However, when the lack of
documentation and root cause analysis surrounding early
issues becomes systematic, it is more challenging to fix
issues which resurface at a time when the teams are
under strict timeline pressure.

Aside from maintaining a record of changes,
configuration-controlled
documentation
helps
newcomers get acquainted with the current status of the
project.

When it is not possible to chase down every issue, due to
lack of resources or time, it can be of great help to at least
record as much data as possible about the early issues in
a structured way, including the test parameters,
observations, and pictures if relevant. The existence of
such a database of early issues will contribute to a more
effective prioritisation within the team of what issues
should be analysed in detail, since it will make it easier
for a team to know which issues have surfaced more than
once and thus may warrant a careful look.

The most problematic consequence of any change in the
configuration baseline is the fact that any verification
activity conducted until that point in time may be
impacted or invalidated by the changes. This may in turn
trigger delta verification activities. The experience in the
FYS programme shows that students are tempted to
hastily implement design change without fully
considering the consequences, resulting in considerable
headaches to solve in often already tight schedules.
Furthermore, rushed changes may generate anomalies in
other disciplines.

In the absence of an independent quality assurance
responsible (typical in student projects), anomalies and
adverse effects are often only superficially analysed, as
students have sometimes not yet recognised the necessity
of carrying out these tasks. At the occurrence of an
anomaly, comprehensive root-cause analyses should be
conducted, as problems might be hidden behind an initial
high-level assessment which appears positive. The
recommendation is to train oneself in observing
anomalies, and to make design choices with a critical
attitude.

To conclude, it is recommend to never underestimate the
value of having a “reviewed and approved”
configuration baseline, achieved for example via a
Critical Design Review process, and to always assess the
consequence of applying a configuration change.

Configuration control

Cleanliness and Contamination Control

From the experience of the FYS project team, the
concept of configuration control is not fully understood,
or not at all known, by university students’ projects. It
can be seen that teams sometimes have difficulties
accepting “good enough” and thus continuing to iterate
and optimise a concept, or the definition of a design,
whenever there is the opportunity to do so. While this
tendency may appear to be beneficial at first glance, the
consequences of a never-ending design process is that
configuration control becomes extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to properly achieve. When the design meets
requirements, then it is “good enough”, and further
changes should be well justified.

Castillo-Sancho

Not all the universities have the resources to enable
hardware work within a certified cleanroom (e.g. ISO8).
This may be a source of issues when the time to discuss
a launch opportunity comes, as the main payload or the
launch authority may impose strict cleanliness
requirements on the CubeSat.
Wherever a cleanroom is not available, alternative
solutions should be sought, such as portable cleanrooms,
laminar flow test benches or restricted-access rooms
with specific cleanliness provisions. The above shall be
coupled with cleanliness and contamination control
practices and cleaning prior to delivery. Tools that may
be useful to conduct cleanliness inspections are a UV
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flashlight (to detect molecular contamination) and a
white flashlight (to detect particulate contamination). To
remove contamination, CubeSat developers may start
with a single-hair brush to remove particulate
contamination and wiping with appropriate chemicals
for molecular contamination.
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CONCLUSION
The FYS programme has collected in this paper some of
the common issues FYS 2 teams faced, as well as
suggesting approaches that any student team reading can
follow to try to reduce the risks in their approach to
CubeSat project development.
It is worth highlighting the fact that many of the lessons
learned collected here are not only related to technical
aspects but also to programmatic, managerial, and legal
issues.
While a prospective CubeSat project team may at first be
focused on the engineering challenge, it is essential for
the project’s success that a solid project management
structure is eventually put into place, as many of the
hardest obstacles to traverse will come in the form of
problems with procurement, student turnover,
documentation, legal, safety, and launch requirements.
The lessons identified here will feed back into the
improvement of future Fly Your Satellite! cycles, from
which many more valuable experiences will surely be
gathered.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank all of the team members
in the CubeSat teams who participated in the Fly Your
Satellite! 2 cycle, including: 3Cat-4, Spain; CELESTA,
France; EIRSAT-1, Ireland; ISTsat-1, Portugal;
LEDSAT, Italy; and UoS3, United Kingdom. It has been
a pleasure to work with each of the teams.
An additional thank you to the ESA specialists and
external experts who have supported reviews, test
campaigns, webinars, and more during the programme.
The contributions from experts have vastly improved the
activities performed by the student teams, and it has been
a great educational experience for all involved.

Castillo-Sancho

13

35th Annual
Small Satellite Conference

